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The  recent  global  crisis  has  reminded  everyone  of  the  importance  of  reforming  the 
international monetary and financial system. The current system is no longer adequate 
to meet the needs of a complex, integrated world economy. Various proposals, both on 
the demand and supply sides, have been put forward, and include building a stronger 
global financial safety net, diversifying the supply of international reserve currencies, and 
so  on.  However,  these  proposals  face  trade-offs  between  desirability  and  political 
feasibility.   
 
In this situation, a practical proposal entails strengthening policy coordination among the 
major economies and reforming the International Monetary Fund. Success on both fronts 
depends heavily on reform of global economic governance and the effectiveness of the 
G20. Asia‘s representation in the G20, and its increased status, give both privileges and 
responsibilities. To meet these responsibilities, Asians should invest greater efforts in 
developing their intellectual leadership in global economic issues. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The  recent global financial  crisis  has  been the  outcome  of,  among  other  things,  the 
mismatch between institutions and the reality of the market in the current global financial 
system. The world we are living in now is drastically different from that of a half century 
ago.  So  is  the  global  financial  market.  Yet  the  basic  design  and  operations  of  the 
international financial institutions (IFIs) are not now that different from then. The Bretton 
Woods institutions and the postwar international monetary order were framed by design 
of and negotiation between, primarily, the United States (US) and the United Kingdom 
during World War II. In the immediate postwar years, the US was the preeminent power 
overseeing  operations  of  the  international  monetary  system  (IMS)  through  the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF); postwar reconstruction and development through the 
World Bank and bilateral economic aid; and liberalization of trade through the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which became the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
1995. With the recovery of Europe and rapid economic growth of Japan, these countries 
became more assertive in global economic governance. But it was essentially the US—
and Western Europe to a smaller degree—that made the global economic rules, with 
Japan largely a follower, usually content to go with the US position under the latter‘s 
nuclear umbrella.   
This scene started to change in the late 1980s and early 1990s. With the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union and consequent impact on Eastern Europe, over 400 million people 
were integrated into the free market economic system. With the opening and accelerated 
growth of the economy of the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) and India, nearly 2.5 
billion people became fully  integrated into the global economic system. That means, 
over the last 20 years, that we have seen economies with half the world‘s population 
integrate  into  the  global  economic  system.  In  addition,  globalization  of  national 
economies across the world, both advanced and developing, started to accelerate in the 
1990s. Emerging economies accelerated their financial deregulation and opening, which 
led to rapid integration of their financial markets into the global market. This also led to 
massive—and volatile—capital inflows to these economies. 
The IFIs that were designed more than 60 years ago can no longer effectively meet the 
challenges  of  the  global  economy.  While  the  global  financial  market  has  become 
integrated like a single market, there is no global central bank or global regulatory body. 
And while global imbalances have intensified, there has been no international instrument 
or mechanism to drive orderly adjustments of those imbalances. Only the global crisis 
could stimulate the adjustment, imposing heavy costs on national economies and the 
global economy. 
There also has been a rapid shift in the weight of economic power. In purchasing power 
parity (PPP) terms, the share of the Group of 7 (G7) countries in global gross domestic 
product (GDP) fell from nearly half to 40% in the last 10 years. During this time, the 
share  of  emerging  market  economies  including  the  PRC  (EMEs)  increased  rapidly. 
Virtually all projections predict that this trend will intensify. For example, the global GDP 
share of the ―BRIC‖ countries—Brazil, Russian Federation, India, and the PRC—was 
20% in 2000. It has increased to 30% in 2010 and is expected to increase to nearly 40%  
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by  2020.  This means  that  we  are facing  not only  inadequate  international  economic 
institutions to cope with global economic issues, but  also an  inadequate governance 
structure at those institutions. 
Therefore,  the  tasks  facing  us  today  are  to reform  (i)  the  IFIs—mandate,  resources, 
management, and governance structure; (ii) the IMS (which usually refers to the rules 
and institutions for international payments) and the regulatory framework of the global 
financial system; and (iii) global economic governance. This last concept is difficult to 
define.  It  is  abstract  in  the  sense  that  there  are  no  such  governance  bodies  or 
organizations  as  we  see  in  the  case  of  national  government.  Global  economic 
governance may be a combination of, at this point, international organizations based on 
treaty or agreement, rules (accounting, capital standards, etc.), norms, practices, and 
decision making for which rules, guidelines, and codes have arisen to manage the global 
economy. For the purposes of this paper, however, the main focus will be on the role of 
the Group of Twenty (G20) summit meetings, largely because at the G20 meeting in 
Pittsburg  in  2009,  leaders  declared  that  the  G20  would  be  a  ―premier forum for  our 
international economic cooperation‖.   
At the center of the rapid change in the distribution of global economic weight has been 
the rapid ascent of the Asian economies during the past half century. Japan took the lead 
in the 1950s–1960s, followed by Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; Singapore; 
and  Taipei,China  in  the  1960–1970s,  with  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  and 
Thailand in the 1980s. But the rapid growth of these economies did not pose a serious 
challenge to global economic governance issues,  because they were  relatively  small 
economies (except Japan), and broadly under the influence of the US or Europe for 
various reasons, including security pacts. However, when the PRC and India woke up 
from  their  rather  long  hibernation  and  started  to  show  staggering  rates  of  economic 
growth, not only did the ascendency of Asia for this century become evident, but also did 
a change of international political and economic dynamics.   
Reflecting these shifts, and with the global crisis, a new global economic governance 
forum, G20, emerged. In this forum, there are five Asian countries (six if we include 
Australia) with a seat. This is in great contrast to the ―outgoing‖ forum, the G7, where 
only one Asian country was represented. Asians have now achieved greater participation 
in global economic governance. But will this achievement in the near future significantly 
change the nature of global economic governance, or the global economic order, or the 
way the IFIs will be run?   
Asians may be happy and proud to have greater representation in such a forum. But we 
Asians also have to recognize that we remain ambivalent about our global roles. We 
want to sit at the high table. We want to alter the rules of the game and have a stronger 
voice  in  global  governance.  But  perhaps  we  still  lack  vision  for  the  future  global 
economic system. We also do not want to take any greater responsibilities or burdens. 
Asian countries so far have been passive followers of the international economic order, 
which was shaped by the West after World War II. They have grown fast in this global 
environment. Most Asian countries, including the PRC and Japan, are preoccupied with 
domestic growth and political stability, and lack the vision of how to shape the future 
global economic system.    
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In  this  situation,  can  we  expect  any  significant  changes  to  the  global  economic 
institutions  and  system  with  the  emergence  of  the  G20?  If,  for  instance,  the  role  of 
international institutions such as the IMF is strengthened (as endorsed by G20 summit 
meetings) without much real change either to their operations or governance structure, 
what  would  that  mean  to  Asia?  Would  that  mean  stronger  governance  over  Asian 
economies by Western controlled and dominated institutions, or a more significant Asian 
role  in  global  governance?  What  should  Asia  do  to  take  the  current  opportunity  of 
enhanced  representation  in  order  to  enhance  its  de  facto  role  in  global  economic 
governance?   
The next section discusses the problems of the IMS. It reviews the present debate and 
discussions on how to reform the IMS along with developing countries‘ interest in the 
system. Section 3 discusses the future role of the G20, which is expected to remain a 
premier forum for global economic governance for a while, as it is important to have 
effective global governance not only for orchestrating the successful reforms of the IMS 
and  the  IFIs  but  for  securing  effective  policy  coordination  for  balanced,  stable,  and 
sustained growth of the global economy. Section 4 discusses how the IFIs (particularly 
the IMF) should be reformed. Section 5 discusses the role of Asia in global economic 
governance. Some conclusions are suggested at the end of the paper. 
 
 
2.  Global Financial Crisis and International Monetary System 
 
There have been extensive discussions about the causes of the global financial crisis: a 
financial regulatory framework that encouraged excessive risk taking and high leverage 
in  financial  institutions;  interconnectedness  among  large  financial  institutions  in  the 
global financial system through derivatives markets; and inadequate fiscal and monetary 
policies that fueled asset bubbles. And so on. From a fundamental standpoint, however, 
the issue starts with the institutional mismatch that failed to meet new challenges posed 
by  the  rapid globalization  that  progressed  over the  last  several  decades.  The global 
financial  market  has  been  integrated  like  a  single  market—yet  there  has  been  no 
international lender of last resort or global regulatory body.   
Financial institutions are competing with each other across national borders these days. 
Banks in the Republic of Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, US, and Europe compete for 
the same clients. Banks in the Republic of Korea, for example, have to compete with 
many other banks from the US, Europe, and Japan, to secure major companies in the 
Republic  of  Korea  (which  already  have  become  global  companies)  as  their  main 
customers. They have to provide similar kinds of banking services to those of foreign 
banks so as to keep them as their customers. In the process, their balance sheets have 
become increasingly exposed to assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currencies 
(especially the dollar) (Park 2010).   
When  an  external  shock,  such  as  the  US  subprime  mortgage  crisis,  hits,  liquidity 
evaporates in the global financial system and banks all over the world face a severe 
liquidity shortage. Banks can be helped over a local currency shortage by their national 
central banks. However, with a shortage of foreign liquidity, central banks in EMEs are 
helpless. Only central banks issuing international reserve currency can bail them out, but  
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these  central  banks‘  operations  are  confined  to  their  national  laws,  even  though  the 
currency  they  issue  is  international.  For  example,  the  Federal  Reserve  issues 
international reserve currency but does not provide liquidity to international banks unless 
they are US-based. This has been one of the factors that pushed EMEs and developing 
countries that do not issue international currency to accumulate large foreign reserves. 
This in turn contributed to the global imbalances. 
Other  problems  face  the  current  IMS.  It  refers  to  the  currency/monetary  regimes  of 
countries, the rules for interventions if an exchange rate is fixed or managed in some 
way, and the institutions that back those rules if there is a problem through official credits, 
controls, or parity changes (IMF 2010a). The IMS is deemed to be no longer adequate to 
meet  the  needs  of  a  complex,  integrated  world  economy.  It  may  even  exacerbate 
instability rather than contain it. In fact, the current IMS is something of a ―non-system‖. 
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the world has divided into two 
camps—one with major currencies that float freely and permit free flows of capital, and 
one with varying degrees of control over exchange rates and cross-border flows (Mateos 
et al. 2010). The current IMS does not have any established mechanism to facilitate the 
adjustment of global imbalances, and so they persist, becoming a source of increased 
uncertainty and instability.   
Current  IMS  problems  can  be  summarized  as  follows.  First,  the  demand  for  foreign 
reserve accumulation has been increasing despite the movement from fixed exchange 
rate  regimes  to  floating  rate  regimes  some  40  years  ago. While  the  collapse  of  the 
Bretton Woods system was expected to lead to smaller holdings of foreign reserves, we 
have in fact seen a rapid rise in them among EMEs, especially after the Asian financial 
crisis  of  1997–98  (Figure  1).  If  this  trend  continues,  it  is  expected  that  total  foreign 
reserves in dollars held outside the US will rise to 700% of US GDP by 2035 from the 
current level of less than 50% (IMF 2010a). 
Second, this increasing demand for foreign reserves has been concentrated in US dollar 
assets,  especially  public  securities.  This  has  made  it  difficult  for  the  US  to  achieve 
internal  and  external  equilibrium.  This  is  not  a  new  problem  for  the  country,  whose 
domestic currency is used as an international currency under the fiat money system (the 
―Triffin‖  dilemma).  But  this  problem  has  become  more  acute  as  the  US  economy 
weakened with deepening internal and external imbalances.   
Third, as the IMS relies too heavily on the supply of currency issued by a center country 
(the US), it gives an exorbitant privilege to this country, which can issue Treasury bills at 
the lowest possible interest rate in the international capital market (Mateos et al. 2010, 
Subacchi and Driffill 2010, IMF 2010a and b, UN 2009). As a result, the center country 
lacks any market pressure for macroeconomic policy discipline, facilitating the buildup of 
asset  bubbles  and  the  worsening  of  global  imbalances.  This,  together  with  loose 
financial regulations, led to those in the market to seek higher yields and take greater 
risks in the financial system. For their part, the EMEs whose currency is not used as 
international currency have to bear a severe and painful adjustment when they face a 
currency crisis, or have to pay a steep cost in maintaining high foreign reserves for self-
insurance    against such a crisis. According to a recent    IMF estimate, EMEs are paying  
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about 1.3% of national income for holding large amounts of foreign reserves (assuming 
a 3 percentage point premium above US Treasury securities) (IMF 2010b).   
Fourth, as a related problem, the global financial system depends too heavily on the 
center country‘s ability to maintain the stability of the value of its currency and strength of 
its own financial system. This overdependence heightens the uncertainty and source of 
instability. As long as the US maintains a sound financial regulatory framework, solid 
macroeconomic policies, and a strong and stable financial system, the system can work 
reasonably  well.  However,  once  US  economic  and  financial-system  credibility  is 
weakened, the global system can become very unstable. If there were an international 
institution (or instruments) that could effectively monitor and govern the soundness and 
stability of the macro-financial policies of the US and other major economies, we might 
see a more stable global financial system. However, there is not. 
Fifth, international capital flows have been distorted in the current IMS. The capital flows 
from  EMEs  and  developing  countries  where  the  productivity  of  capital  investment  is 
higher,  to  advanced  economies,  especially  the  US,  where  the  return  to  capital 
investment is lower. This distortion reduces the investment opportunities for developing 
countries to construct their infrastructure and industrial base for higher economic growth. 
Given these problems, there have been various proposals to reform the current IMS, 
which fall into two groups: demand-side and supply-side reform. 
2.1  Demand-side Reform 
The  key  here  is  how  to  reduce  the  widespread  strong  demand  for  foreign  reserve 
holdings among EMEs. Self-insurance against currency crisis is not their sole motivation 
for  large  foreign  reserves.  The  export-oriented  growth  strategy  has  also  been  a 
significant motivation to undervalue the currency and sterilize capital inflows, leading to a 
large  accumulation  of  foreign  reserves.  However,  according  to  one  estimate,  self-
insurance—especially after the Asian currency crisis—accounts for one-half to two-thirds 
of total reserves and accounted for about half the increase of total foreign reserves in the 
decade to 2008 (Obstfeld et al. 2008).   
In the current global financial market environment where capital flows are volatile, EMEs 
and developing economies run a high risk of currency crisis. They have to walk a very 
narrow line of policy discipline between openness of their financial system and sound 
economic management. Although the history of their financial market opening is short, 
many of these economies‘ capital markets are more open and integrated into the global 
system than the advanced economies (Figure 2). If their balance-of-payments position 
deteriorates for a sustained period, they have a high risk of, at some point, facing a 
massive sudden reversal of foreign capital flow, with a huge impact on the domestic 
financial system and the economy. Even    though economic management may be sound 
in these countries, they are exposed to    risk through contagion from a crisis that has 
begun  elsewhere.  To  insure  against    such  a  possibility,  they  have  to  manage  their 
external balance carefully,    maintaining a competitive export environment and a stable 
macroeconomic situation,    including    currency    stability    and    competitiveness. This   
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pushes them to intervene in the currency market when there are massive inflows  of 
foreign capital and a buildup of foreign reserves. 
   
There have been several proposals to reduce the self-insurance motivation and thereby 
demand for foreign reserves. They include third-party insurance and the expansion of 
the opportunity to borrow from a global and regional reserve pool, or access to a global 
lender of last resort (or something similar). However, the first option would be too costly. 
The private market to insure against such  a  risk has so far failed to be established. 
Public insurance through any international organization would be too costly and unfair in 
sharing the burden (IMF 2010a and b). 
That leads us to the second option—building a stronger global financial safety net. The   
authorities of the Republic of Korea, which hosted the Seoul G20 Summit in November 
2010, have taken an initiative with the IMF to push through this option by improving the 
current financing facilities of the IMF. The IMF has made some innovations in its lending 
program in consultation with the G20 countries‘ authorities and these were endorsed at 
Seoul. These innovations include refining the flexible credit line (FCL) by increasing the 
size  and  maturity  of  the  loan  with  improved  pre-qualification  criteria  for  the  loan  to 
reduce the ―stigma‖ effect; and creating new lending facilities, called the precautionary 
credit line (PCL), for the countries who are not fully qualified for FCL but with generally 
sound polices, that need some precautionary financing (IMF 2010). The G20 Summit in 
Seoul also agreed on efforts to increase the link between the IMF regional financing 
facilities.   
2.2  Supply-side Reform 
Discussions on supply-side reform of the IMS focus on how to diversify the supply of 
international  reserve  currency.  The  proposals  include  moving  to  a  multiple  currency 
system; increased allocation and wider use of special drawing rights (SDR); and creating 
a new global reserve currency. A more diversified allocation across available and new 
reserve assets would reduce the system‘s (and individual countries‘) exposure to risks 
stemming from  economic  outturns  and  policies in  a single  country,  and may  provide 
more stable stores of value by increasing reserve issuers‘ incentives to pursue sound 
policies  and  avoid  losing  associated  benefits.  While  global  reserves  are  already 
diversified to some degree and further diversification is likely to continue slowly over time, 
the pace and eventual degree may not be enough to bring about the desirable balance 
in supply, especially if reserve accumulation continues apace (IMF 2010a and b).   
A key question is whether diversification should be encouraged among suitable existing 
currencies,  or  if  it  should  be  sought  more  with  global  reserve  assets,  acting  as  a 
complement or even substitute to existing ones (IMF 2010a). All proposals have their 
pros and cons; they also face trade-offs between desirability and political feasibility. As 
the world becomes more multipolar in terms of GDP, the drive for a multicurrency system 
that mimics global economic weights is likely to increase.  A  more diversified reserve 
system would be better in that it would help discipline policies of all reserve issuers, 
given enhanced substitutability of their assets. However, a disadvantage would be lower 
network externalities and possible costs for trade and investment due to volatility among 
major reserve currencies (McKinsey Global Institute 2009).    
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A more ambitious reform option would be to develop a global currency.  Issued by a 
global  central  bank,  it  would  be  designed  as a  stable  store  of  value that  is  not tied 
exclusively to the conditions of any particular economy. One option is for that global 
currency to be adopted by fiat as a common currency (like the euro was), an approach 
that would immediately result in widespread use and eliminate exchange rate volatility 
among adopters. A somewhat less ambitious option would be for the global currency to 
circulate alongside national currencies, though it would need to be adopted by fiat in at 
least some countries for an exchange market to develop. If the global currency were to 
circulate  as  a  dominant  currency  in  place  of  the  US  dollar,  then  current  account 
imbalances  that  reflect  today‘s  situation—surplus  countries  pegging  to  the  global 
currency with deficit countries floating against it—would adjust more systematically, and 
perhaps more automatically than in the current system since the deficit currencies would 
be expected to depreciate against the global currency (IMF 2010a). However, this option 
would suffer from the same problems that are faced by common currency areas such as 
the eurozone. Adoption of a common currency could limit scope for adjustment to shocks 
by individual countries. It would be essential to construct governance arrangements that 
ensure  accountability  of  the  global  currency-issuing  institution  while  ensuring  its 
independence.  It  also  requires  a  substantial  concession  of  economic  sovereignty  by 
individual countries. Hence political feasibility is very low.   
As another option, a greater role could be considered for SDR (for example, UN 2009, 
IMF 2010a and b, Zhou 2009). The SDR had been almost forgotten until the recent 
global crisis. The SDR is an international reserve asset created by the IMF in 1969 to 
supplement  official  reserves  of  member  countries.  For  countries  with  a  balance-of-
payments need, it represents an unconditional right to obtain foreign exchange or other 
key reserve assets from other IMF members. The value of the SDR is based on a basket 
of  currencies  (currently  the  US  dollar,  euro,  yen,  and  pound).
1  But  it  is  not  itself  a 
currency.   
There are many benefits to using the SDR broadly as a reserve asset. With a value 
defined in terms of a basket of major currencies, it has more stable store-of-value and 
unit-of-account attributes. As in the case of the putative global currency, if some surplus 
countries that currently peg to a national currency (such as the US dollar) were to peg 
instead to the SDR, some automaticity would be introduced in the global adjustment 
process as the currencies of deficit countries could depreciate relative to others in the 
basket. However, one disadvantage is that its use so far has been essentially restricted 
to the official sector and only about SDR200 billion (about 4% of total global reserves) 
has been allocated to member countries (IMF 2010a). Additional hurdles to developing 
an SDR-based system include potential resistance from reserve issuers who have no 
direct  use for SDRs; restrictive allocation rules and complicated usage rules; lack of 
deep and liquid markets; and the need to convert SDRs into a freely usable currency for 
most payment transactions. 
In 2009, Mr Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People‘s Bank of China, suggested wider 
use of the SDR as a reserve asset (Zhou 2009). As the confidence in the future value of 
the US dollar has weakened, countries with large amounts of US-dollar foreign reserve 
                                            
1  In the future, the PRC yuan and the Brazilian Real, for instance, could be included.  
8    |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 73 
 
 
assets are concerned about losing value. If, for instance, the PRC moves to rebalance 
its foreign reserve composition from the dollar to other currencies, it risks causing an 
immediate fall in the dollar, with no beneficial consequences for the PRC, the US, or the 
global economy. If the PRC could hold more SDR instead, its foreign reserves would be 
immediately better diversified into that currency basket, becoming more stable in value. 
This  would  be  possible  when  there  is  an  international  agreement  to  expand  the 
allocation and use of the SDR, extending its use from the official to the private sector.   
2.3  Historical Experience and Prospects 
As discussed above, although there have been widely shared views on the problems of 
the current IMS, there are different views on how to reform it, or even if it needs to be 
reformed.  Some  economists  argue  that  we  need  fundamental  reform  while  others 
believe that we cannot find any better alternative to the current system in the near future. 
The latter group also argues that what we need is reform of the regulatory aspects of the 
global  financial—not  monetary—system.  They  argue  that  the  current  system  is  the 
outcome  of  an  evolution  that  complemented  the  weakness  of  the  previous  systems, 
including the gold standard, Bretton Woods, and the interwar free-floating system, and 
has worked reasonably well over the last 40 years (Truman 2009).   
The  evolution  of  the IMS  has  been  shaped  not  only  by  the  experiences  of  previous 
systems but also by the dominant economic thoughts, balance of economic weights, and 
political economy of the time. The dominant reserve currency changed with the shift of 
economic power, but only after a substantial time lag. In the initial stages, the dominant 
country was always reluctant to accept changes and push reforms, while the emerging 
power was hesitant to accept greater responsibility as a reserve issuer. As a result, there 
was no big impact, but only gradual and incremental change.   
As with the dollar today, the demise of the pound was widely anticipated but the process 
was more gradual than expected and a widely predicted abrupt collapse was avoided. 
Even  though  the  emergence  of  the  US  as  the  dominant  economic  power  became 
evident  after  World  War I,  the  pound  played  the  role  of  major  international  reserve 
currency for a while. The IMF estimated that official sterling reserves, excluding those 
held by colonies, were four times the value of official dollar reserves and that in 1947 
sterling still accounted for about 87% of global foreign exchange reserves (Schenk 2010). 
It took 10 years from the end of World War II (and a 30% devaluation of the pound) 
before the share of dollar reserves exceeded that of sterling. The shift from sterling to 
the dollar and the elimination of sterling as a major international currency resulted in 
periodic crises, international tensions, and conflict over the United Kingdom‘s domestic 
economic  policy.  In  short,  although  it  was  not  a  painless  transformation,  it  was  still 
tempered by international commitment to avoid a damaging tipping point for sterling that 
would have undermined confidence in the IMS as a whole (Schenk 2010).   
The transition this century would likewise require close collaboration among the major 
players—incumbent and emerging powers—to avoid turbulence and severe instability in 
the  international  financial  system.  The  shape  of  the  IMS  in  the  21st  century  will  be 
significantly influenced by the views, interests, and requirements of the emerging powers. 
However, it is important to ensure the sustainability of the current system and avoid its  
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collapse. This should include efforts at the least to strengthen policy coordination and 
collaboration among the major economies, and to reform the IMF to make it a more 
effective  institution  for  bilateral  and  multilateral  surveillance  and  as  an  international 
lender of last resort. The success on both fronts depends heavily on global economic 
governance reform and the role of the G20. 
 
 
3.  Global Economic Governance Reform and the G20 
 
The global financial crisis provided momentum for the emergence of the G20 Summit as 
a premier forum for international economic cooperation. It is now clear that the problems 
of global imbalances, economic recession and recovery,  and financial system  reform 
cannot be discussed without involving EMEs. The G7 can no longer be the right forum. 
For example, the G7 summit meeting started in 1974, and it took 13 years for G7 leaders 
to agree to meet annually. But it took only one year for G20 leaders to expect to meet 
annually. This shows how much such a forum was needed. 
Any  governance  body  is  subject  to  a  test  of  legitimacy,  representativeness,  and 
effectiveness—and the G20 is no exception. The G20, like the G7, is a self-proclaimed 
global economic governance forum. It is not formed on the basis of any international 
treaty or agreement. The G20 represents about 85% of the world‘s GDP, 80% of its trade, 
and 67% of its population (Heinbecker 2010). Countries from all continents are included 
in the G20. In contrast to the G7 membership, the G20 includes all the systemically 
important countries such as the large emerging economies of the PRC, Brazil, and India. 
Therefore, legitimacy and representativeness may not be an important hurdle for the 
G20 to function as a global governance forum. There is no clear reason why those 20 
particular leaders should sit around the same table, but any other selection would invite 
similar questions and criticism. The G20 seems to be a reasonable grouping as it is 
balanced between advanced and emerging economies, and regionally. Effectiveness, 
however, could be a serious challenge.   
As the world may be unable to find an alternative to the G20, the G20 may well stay as 
the  premier  forum  for  global  economic  governance—for  at  least  some  time.  Still, 
although it showed its usefulness as a forum for policy cooperation during the crisis, it is 
unclear whether it can continue to be an effective global economic governance body. 
The experience of the G7 suggests that G20 could become no more than an annual 
diplomatic  event  of  leaders  meeting  without  any  significant  outcome  to  address  or 
resolve  global  economic  issues.  A  meeting  with  20  leaders  will  find  it  harder  to  be 
effective than one with seven or eight. 
As discussed,  however, the global economy desperately  needs an effective forum to 
coordinate economic policies among advanced and developing countries. It has been 
fortunate that the G20 emerged as a premier forum, and this could be the most profound 
evolution in global economic governance over the last couple decades. It represents the 
first adaptation of the global governance  structure to reflect dramatic changes in the 
distribution of power since the end of the Cold War. It is also the only forum in which 
major established and emerging players meet in a setting of formal equality, unlike the 
two-tiered Security Council of the UN or the weighted voting in the IFIs.    
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The G20 acknowledges that global governance cannot be done by the West alone. It 
can provide a framework in which established and emerging powers can work out an 
agreement and negotiate breakthroughs on pressing global economic issues. As Patrick 
(2010) says ―G20 has the potential to shake up the geopolitical order, introducing greater 
flexibility into global diplomacy and transcending the stultifying bloc politics that have too 
often hamstrung cooperation on global governance in formal, treaty-based institutions, 
including the United Nations.‖ 
The  US  proposed  a  mutual  assessment  of  economic  policies  on  the  basis  of  a 
―Framework  for  Strong,  Sustainable,  and  Balanced  Growth‖  at  the  G20  Summit  in 
Pittsburg  in  September  2009.  The  US  has  subjected  itself  to  peer  reviews  of  the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the IMF. However, ‗‘this 
is the first time the US has agreed, even proposed, to submit itself to a structured, full 
peer  review  process‖  (Lombardi  2010)  in  a  forum  such  as  the  G20  where,  at  least 
formally, the peers participate on an equal footing, globally.   
Through this framework, leaders pledged to devise a method for setting objectives, to 
develop policies to support such objectives, and to assess outcomes through mutual 
evaluation.  The  IMF‘s  involvement  has  been  sought  in  providing  analysis  on  various 
national  and  regional  policy  frameworks  and  how  they  fit  together.  On  the  basis  of 
country  submissions,  the  IMF  has  been  asked  to  point  out  inconsistencies  and/or 
incoherence in national assumptions, to evaluate the mutual compatibility of different 
country  frameworks  and  policies,  and  to  determine  the  aggregate  effects  of  various 
national  frameworks  and  policies  in  the  global  economy.  Once  the  entire  framework 
process has been completed (the aim was by the Seoul G20 meeting), it could then be 
fully  implemented  annually.  This  mutual  assessment  of  macroeconomic  policies 
represents the first instance of multilateral surveillance on a global scale in recent history. 
Previously, such surveillance was, at best, handled within the closed circle of the G7.   
3.1  The G20 Role in Global Governance System—A Kind of Legislature? 
There  are  three  types  of  institutions  in  the  global  governance  system:  international 
organizations, government networks, and non-state actors (Mo 2010). The last includes 
transnational civil society groups and business associations. International organizations 
and  government  networks  are  both  intergovernment  organizations  (IGOs).  The  main 
difference is the degree of formality. An international organization is the more structured 
of the two, that is, it has a constitutive intergovernment agreement and a secretariat. In 
contrast,  government  networks  are  often  created  without  a  formal  intergovernment 
agreement and managed without a secretariat. According to this classification, the G20 
is a government network in that it has neither a charter nor a secretariat. However, the 
G7/G8  and  G20  are  government  networks  whose  jurisdictions  overlap  with  those  of 
existing  international  organizations  that  affect  their  decisions—they  are  supervisory 
government networks. Since such networks make decisions that existing international 
organizations are expected to implement, they should be viewed as a kind of legislative 
body with international organizations playing the role of executive agency. The fact that 
the G7/G8 and the G20 exist and have become more influential over time suggests that 
there is a demand in the global governance system for an effective supervisory and 
legislative body that is independent of international organizations (Mo 2010).    
What do Asian Countries Want the Seat at the High Table for? G20 as a New Global Economic  |    11   





The  G7  began  as  a  kind  of  caucus,  an  informal  group  of  legislators,  with  leaders 
reluctant to involve ministers and refusing to create a permanent secretariat. The global 
governance system demands a new organization that can work as a legislature and the 
G20, at this moment, is the available alternative. Some observers say that the G20 is 
already  acting  as  a  sort  of  legislature  as  it  directs  new  rules for  the global financial 
system and assigns tasks to the IFIs.
2   
The role of the IFIs has been limited to their own jurisdiction and, to a large extent, they 
have not been able to be effective even in their given jurisdictions. They have been 
marginalized  in  global  economic  governance  and  have  failed  to  address  cross-
jurisdictional issues such as financial stability (Stewart 1996, Varma 2002, Bryant 2010). 
Of course, the G20 faces difficulties in meeting this role. It is a group of ―systemically 
important‖ economies. Unfortunately, except for their economic impact, G20 members 
have little in common with respect to their ideologies and levels of development. This 
strengthens  the  need  for  the  G20  to  become  more  institutionalized  in  its  process  of 
making agreements, decisions, and overall implementation.   
A  legislature has two core functions: legislation, and oversight of executive agencies. 
The G20 should provide the mandate and oversight of the operations of international 
economic organizations. It should also be a place where effective policy coordination 
among member countries happens. But for the G20 to meet these two functions, there 
should be innovative institutional design for the G20.   
One  element  of  criticism  for  the  G7/G8  summits  was  the  lack  of  continuity  and 
implementation  monitoring.  The  G20  will  have  to  demonstrate  that  it  can  do  better. 
However, with the increased number of participants relative to the G7/G8 and the likely 
more comprehensive agenda of the G20, the preparation and follow-up process for the 
G20 summit will be more complex and demanding as it involves many more players and 
less  continuity  in  the  leadership.  Furthermore,  unlike  the G7,  which  is  a  like-minded 
group,  the  G20  is  extremely  diverse  in  terms  of  political  organization  and  ideology. 
Divergences among the G20 were masked during the first year of the crisis, as countries 
focused on the short-term, urgent goals of preventing global economic depression. As 
the  world  has  started  to  come  out  of  the  crisis,  the  underlying  diversity  of  opinions, 
interests, and perspectives in the G20 could reemerge. Diversity in the composition of 
the membership has the risk of hindering consensus building within the G20 as was 
evidenced  in  the  Toronto  and  Seoul  summits,  and,  therefore,  hurting  the  G20‘s 
effectiveness as a global decision-making body.   
To  build  consensus  and  ensure  effectiveness,  the  G20  requires  creative  intuitional 
innovations. One of them would be to set up a G20 secretariat or something similar (Linn 
                                            
2  Mo (2010) says for example, ―In thinking about the meaning and significance of the G20 in the history of 
global governance, it is constructive to take a step back from current issues and ask ourselves what the 
founding  fathers  of  the  new  global  governance  system  would  make  of  the  G20.  Seen  from  this 
constitutional perspective, it is clear that the G20 belongs to the legislative branch side of the global 
governance system. The G20 is already acting like a legislature as it legislate new rules for the world 
economy and tasks and evaluates international financial institutions.‖    
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2010, Carin 2010). At the finance minister level, the G20 chair is part of a revolving 
three-member management troika of ―sherpas,‖ consisting of the current chair, as well as 
the  immediately  preceding  and  succeeding  chairs.  The  management  picture  at  the 
leader level is less clear. The chair country now sets up a temporary secretariat for the 
duration of its term. The temporary secretariat coordinates the group work with technical 
support from the IFIs. But the G20 reliance on temporary and rotating arrangements is 
unlikely to last long as they already create the problem of work discontinuity and conflicts 
of interests. A rotating secretariat makes it hard for the G20 to maintain organizational 
coherence. The IMF can play a type of secretariat role for the G20; however, the agenda 
for the G20 could be broadened beyond macro-financial issues, such as energy and 
trade. Also, it may not be a good idea for the G20 to depend too much on the IMF for 
secretariat functions as this may compromise its ability to reform and monitor the IMF. 
However,  concerns  have  been  expressed  that  leaders  would  not  want  to  see  a 
bureaucratic  structure  take  over  the  G20  summit  or  that  the  existence  of  a  heavy 
secretarial  structure  could  undermine  the  commitment  by  the  national  executive 
agencies to their engagement in the G20 summit processes. The aim is to manage and 
organize the summit to ensure continuity, institutional memory, and the implementation 
of plans and promises that are yet to be driven by member governments. The challenge 
will therefore be to keep any secretariat structure small, non-bureaucratic, and driven by 
member governments.   
Alternative  options  could  be  considered  to  ensure  effective  logistical  and  technical 
support for the G20, such as cross-posting of high-level staff from countries that have 
had the G20  presidency  in the past to countries taking on this role. Stronger  liaison 
contact points and implementation-reporting requirements could be established in the 
key international institutions that are tasked with follow-up on the G20 summits (Linn 
2010).   
The  G20  currently  works  as  a  ―committee  as  the  whole‖  without  select  or  standing 
committees. As the number of issues that the G20 takes up increases, the G20 may 
consider the use of standing committees to divide work among member countries.   
 
 
4.  Reform of the International Monetary Fund 
 
The  IMF,  as  a  key  institution  of  the  IMS,  has  not  played  an  effective  role  in  the 
surveillance of the global economy and financial market. The recent upgrading of the 
IMF by the G20 as the main institution for the surveillance of the global financial market 
and economy, and the willingness of some G20 countries to include the reform of the 
IMS  in  future  agenda  (Taylor  2010)  suggest  that  the  IMF  should  be  substantially 
reformed  to  meet  the  challenges  of  this  upgraded  role.  The  areas  to  reform  are 
resources, lending facilities, surveillance, and governance/management. Some of them 
have already been endorsed by the G20 and agreed to by member countries, but in 
some areas more innovative ideas must be sought.  
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4.1  Resources 
The resources available to the IMF are far smaller than current global capital flows, and 
are a small fraction of total foreign reserves held by EMEs. The G20 summit meeting in 
London endorsed the move to increase IMF resources, including quota and borrowing 
capacity. The expansion and modification of the New Arrangement for Borrowing (NAB) 
by roughly $500 billion will approximately triple the total resources available for lending, 
from  the  current  level  of  $250  billion.  This  will  help  the  IMF  to  be  more  effective  in 
meeting the financing gap to member countries when they face foreign-currency liquidity 
problems. Still, its total available resources may not be enough to support all the new 
lending facilities under discussion to strengthen the global financial safety net. They will 
still be less than half the foreign reserves of the PRC alone. Thus, a further increase in 
resources  will  be  required  to  support  the  new  lending  facilities.  To  meet  this  need, 
perhaps, the current total quota size should also be doubled at the least.
3   
4.2  Lending Facilities 
The IMF introduced the FCL in 2009, in response to criticism that its lending facilities to 
address unexpected foreign liquidity crises faced by EMEs are too rigid and have costly 
policy conditionality. However, only three countries—Colombia, Mexico, and Poland—
used FCL as they faced severe liquidity problems in the global financial crisis. Other 
EMEs, including the Republic of Korea, refused to use the FCL—though they also faced 
severe liquidity problems—since they were afraid of the stigma effect.   
The crisis highlighted three potential gaps in the global financial safety net. First, many 
countries  and  observers  feel  that  the  FCL  is  not  as  predictable  and  effective  an 
instrument as it was initially planned to be. Second, there is a sense that the FCL caters 
to  only  a  narrow  group  of  countries  and  it  offers  too  little  to  those  well-performing 
countries that are ineligible for FCL. Third, the IMF does not have adequate instruments 
to act proactively and contain risks in a systemic crisis where several major EMEs, with 
varying degrees of concern about the stigma effect, may benefit from an early and clear 
signal  by  having  access  to  financial  resources  to  calm  the  market  fears  that  stoke 
contagion.   
The IMF is not the only institution with a mandate to provide a global financial safety net. 
Central  banks  of  reserve  currency-issuing  countries  and  regional  financing 
arrangements, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), also have a role to play. In the 
case of the Republic of Korea, the swap arrangement between the Federal Reserve and 
the Bank of Korea in 2009 was the most effective way to calm foreign exchange market 
instability. Furthermore, careful consideration will need to be practiced in balancing the 
goal of a more effective global financial safety net against potential moral hazard and the 
need for adequate safeguards. However, the above observations still call for a reform of 
the IMF‘s financing facilities.   
The IMF has recently introduced some innovations to its lending facilities, including the 
modification of the existing lending program as well as the introduction of new lending 
                                            
3  Doubling of the IMF quota was endorsed by the leaders in the G20 Summit Meeting in Seoul.  
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facilities (FCL and PCL, as discussed above). The IMF has also been discussing with 
G20 governments on how it might, in well-defined circumstances, use a multicountry 
swap  line  mechanism  to  offer  liquidity  unilaterally  to  a  limited  set  of  systemically 
important countries with strong policy records. This has not yet materialized.   
Moral  hazards  and  resource  constraints  could  be  obstacles  to  the  expansion  of  the 
global safety net through the reform of the IMF‘s financing facilities. However, given the 
strong and increasing demand for foreign reserves for self-insurance by EMEs, which 
threatens the stability of the IMS, these reforms are badly needed. The new facilities 
would be useful additions to the IMF lending armory and would enhance its capacity to 
act as international lender of last resort.   
Bilateral  swap  arrangements  between  central  banks  are  only  on  an  ad  hoc  and 
temporary  basis,  while  they  could  be  a  very  effective  tool  to  stabilize  the  foreign 
exchange  market  in  time  of  global  financial  crisis.  Multilateralization  and 
institutionalization of the swap arrangements through the IMF could be an effective way 
of building a global financial safety net, providing a global public good in the current 
global financial market environment  where  national  economies  are  closely  integrated 
and  there is little distinction between national and global financial systems. To some 
extent, it may be the responsibility of the central banks that issue international reserve 
currency (especially the Federal Reserve) to provide the global financial system with 
some role of ―lender of last resort‖ themselves. If this is difficult to institutionalize due to 
these banks‘ national laws, it may be done indirectly through the IMF. These central 
banks could commit some resources under certain conditions to the IMF, with the IMF in 
turn  providing  a  modality  to  use  these  resources  for  EMEs  according  to  certain 
prespecified rules and conditions.   
4.3  Surveillance 
Increased access to and expansion of the IMF‘s emergency lending facilities should be 
accompanied by greater and more effective surveillance of member country economies 
by the IMF. The IMF failed to establish itself as a credible monitor of the IMS or as a 
provider  of  credible  surveillance  over  macroeconomic  and financial  sector  policies of 
individual  economies.  Most  severe  criticism  centered  on  the  asymmetry  of  its 
surveillance—too harsh on small developing countries with a deficit while almost mute 
on advanced economies and surplus countries.   
The IMF surveillance should be strengthened in both the bilateral and multilateral arenas. 
The IMF should be able to clearly point out the problems in member countries, including 
advanced economies, which they can take seriously so as to make the necessary policy 
adjustments. For that, IMF leverage should be strengthened. This can be done only in a 
multilateral context such as the G20. The G20 should strengthen its function of mutual 
assessment of macroeconomic policies with the objective of ―strong, sustainable, and 
balanced growth.‖ Global economic surveillance should, indeed, be one of the G20‘s 
important roles. If the G20 mandates some significant role for the IMF in this process, 
strengthened  peer  pressure  could  give  the  IMF‘s  bilateral  surveillance  more  bite.  Its 
multilateral surveillance, too, needs to be strengthened, both on macroeconomic policies    
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and financial market issues. The surveillance role of the IMF should be reinforced to 
more effectively address problems of exchange rates and payment disequilibria. 
In order to produce objective and neutral reports on the economic policies of individual 
countries, it would be necessary to insulate IMF staff from political pressures from their 
own board. The IMF needs to issue its own reports on exchange rate policies of major 
member countries, assessing a wider range of policies (including monetary, fiscal, and 
exchange  rate)  and  financial  sectors  more  frequently  and  independently.  It  should 
perhaps be the IMF management rather than the board that has the authority to approve 
such surveillance reports, to help keep staff from political pressure. 
The G20 countries have so far committed to a peer-review process for their economic 
policies and to a broadly defined policy objective. This does not mean that they have 
committed to specifically defined policy targets for which they can be held accountable in 
a  multilateral  forum.  This  is  reminiscent  of  early  IMF  attempts,  in  the  1970s,  to  get 
systemically  important  countries  to  commit  to  a  multilateral  surveillance  framework 
(Lombardi  2010).  Ultimately,  these  countries  distanced  themselves  from  specific 
commitments  and  the  IMF  multilateral  surveillance  became  simply  a  forum  for 
exchanging views and information on each other‘s economic policies. With the G7, the 
IMF played an advisory role; but with the G20, its advisory role is more clearly spelled 
out, and, given the greater number of economies, needs to be much more strategic. 
Nevertheless, its role of surveillance is not clearly mandated yet.   
The G20 itself should implement effective mutual assessment on the macroeconomic 
and financial policies of member countries in the context of well-defined objectives set 
for the whole group. The IMF should be asked to provide the framework and technical 
support  of  this  assessment,  which  should  be  based  on  some  rigorous  quantitative 
analysis.
4  It may be asked to strengthen the ―score-keeping‖ capacity by allowing it to 
issue its own quarterly reports on exchange rate and other relevant policies (Subacchi 
and  Driffill  2010).  The  IMF  would  thereby  become  more  vigorously  engaged  in  the 
mutual  assessment  process.  This  would  help  to  increase  its  leverage  in  its  bilateral 
surveillance of its major member countries.   
The success of mutual assessment or peer-review surveillance depends critically on two 
essential ingredients: competent staff to support the process, and a strong analytical 
foundation for studying macroeconomic interactions. It would, in fact, be difficult to find a 
better alternative to the IMF for this role. What, then, should the IMF do to fulfill this 
task? In essence, it should perform sharply defined multilateral surveillance, generate 
greater value and traction from bilateral surveillance, and integrate the two better. For 
that, it should do more analysis of outward spillovers, and generate new reports covering 
such spillovers from countries whose policies or circumstances affect the overall system.   
In order to increase the effectiveness of bilateral surveillance, especially with advanced 
economies and surplus countries, the IMF should try to reach broader audiences than it 
                                            
4  At  the  Seoul  Summit  Meeting,  the  leaders  agreed  to  enhance  the  mutual  assessment  process  to 
promote external sustainability. Persistently large imbalances, assessed against indicative guidelines to 
be agreed by finance ministers and central bank governors, would warrant an assessment of their nature 
and the root causes of impediments to adjustment as part of the process.    
16    |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 73 
 
 
does now by producing more timely and topical reports, and increase engagement with 
stakeholders. By increasing the peer pressure of the global community through its timely 
and  credible  reports,  it  can  improve  the  effectiveness  of  its  bilateral  as  well  as 
multilateral surveillance. Setting up an independent outside panel of experts, which can 
regularly evaluate and monitor the IMF‘s performance in such surveillance, could also be 
a helpful measure.   
4.4  Governance/Management 
Enhanced surveillance by the IMF would mean increased IMF interventions in member 
countries‘  economic  policies.  However,  unless  changed  from  previous  practice—one 
dominated by the traditional powers—it would be regarded by most EMEs as a worse 
outcome.  Hence  the  most  important  element  of  IMF  reform  is  radical  change  to  its 
governance structure. 
There was wide criticism in the past that the IMF has been used as an instrument for 
industrial nations to achieve their policy objectives. It bailed out creditors of industrial 
countries and imposed very costly adjustment programs on debtor countries. Mistrust in 
the IMF is in part due to the perception that its surveillance has been asymmetric, with 
greatest  attention  paid to  the  weaker  developing states  or those  in  deficit,  while  the 
major deficit and surplus countries, including the US and the PRC, are given too much 
leeway. Mistrust is also in part due to its policy conditionality based on too much (or 
sometimes axiomatic) ―belief in the market.‖ This is not to say that the IMF has made no 
attempt to overcome this criticism. In recent years, it has in fact become more flexible in 
its approach to individual country situations and has somewhat shifted its position from 
emphasizing quick adjustment to expanded financing as a possible alternative to rapid 
adjustments (Adam, Collier, and Vines 2010). Nevertheless, further efforts are needed to 
establish trust among all its member countries, and this can be done most effectively 
through rebalancing of the governance/management structure of the institution.   
There are two major problems with present governance arrangements: the composition 
and voting structure of the board, and the appointment of management and those at 
senior positions. The board is too heavily weighted toward industrial countries, especially 
in Europe, and it fails to give sufficient weight to EMEs and developing countries, which 
are of course seriously affected by its decisions. Currently, the quota share of advanced 
economies is more than 60% (US 17.6%, Europe 31%). EMEs and developing countries‘ 
share is about 39%. However, Europe‘s voice can be potentially much bigger than this 
figure suggests, due to the current composition of the executive board.   
At the G20 Seoul Summit it was agreed that 6% of the quota share would be transferred 
from Europe to EMEs, though the formula to achieve this has not been fully sorted out. It 
was also agreed that two seats of the executive board currently occupied by Europe 
would be transferred to EMEs. However,  these two measures  would not change the 
governance  structure  significantly—the  US  and  Western  Europe  would  still  dominate 
decision making through various rules (including the ―85% rule‖ and the veto power of 
the US) and through the composition of the executive board. Would EMEs, say Asian 
EMEs,  welcome  strengthened  IMF  surveillance  with  this  unchanged  governance 
structure? Unlikely.  
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The governance structure should be more radically changed, for without it, the IMF risks 
becoming marginalized as an agent solely for a group of industrial countries. (As noted, 
there is a large asymmetry between the governance structures of G20 and the IMF.) 
Ideally, the formula for IMF quota reallocation should give emerging economic powers 
more  representation  than  their  current  economic  weight  (which  is  based  on  nominal 
GDP) justifies. However, as this would be difficult to implement in reality, other measures 
would have to be sought. One way would be a reconfiguration of the composition of the 
board of directors, cutting the number of European seats—a single eurozone seat could 
be an option. 
Another  way  would  be  to  have  the  G20  finance  ministers  meeting  as  a  steering 
committee for IMF governance, determining the direction of major policy issues. If the 
G20 became a decision-making ministerial body within the IMF itself, it would reduce the 
asymmetry  both  between  global  economic  governance  forums  and  the  governance 
structure of the IMF. This would also help reassert the centrality of the IMF‘s role as a 
key institution in the IMS. This proposal has been featured in a recent advisory report to 
the IMF Managing Director (the ―Fourth Pillar‖ report) and has been put forward by a 
number people, including Mervyn King, governor of the Bank of England (Lombardi 2010, 
King 2010).
5  The progress of reform of the IMS, including increased allocation and wider 
use  of  SDR  as  international  reserve  assets,  could  be  facilitated  when  this  kind  of 
significant change in the IMF governance structure occurs.   
On  the  second  problem,  that  of  appointments,  the  selection  process  for  managing 
director  should  become  more  transparent  and  be  open  to  qualified  non-Europeans, 
including  those  from  EMEs.  Appointments  to  senior  positions  should  be  more  merit-
based, and better balanced between staff from advanced economies and EMEs. (Similar 
changes will be required for the World Bank.)   
 
5.  Global Economic Governance and the Role of Asia 
 
Although  the  global  financial  crisis  prompted  the  G20  Summit,  it  was,  more 
fundamentally,  a  decision  to  integrate  rising  powers,  mainly  from  Asia,  into  the 
multilateral system. In the G7/G8, only one Asian country, Japan, was represented; in 
G20,  five  (six  with  Australia).  So  the  question  now  is:  If  Asia  secured  proper 
representation for itself in the global governance system, what would it do with it? Does it 
have a clear vision—or any vision—for the future global economic system?   
Under the current global economic order, indeed, Asian economies developed quickly 
and prospered, and to a large extent have been the main beneficiaries of the postwar 
settlement,  taking  full  advantage  of  it.  Successive  trade  rounds  of  the  General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (which significantly reduced trade barriers of industrial 
nations while allowing developing countries some preferential treatment), as well as the 
export-oriented  growth  strategy  of  most  Asian  nations,  made  their  rapid  growth  and 
industrialization possible. Increased capital flows and investment (direct and portfolio) by 
the West accelerated their growth potential. Further back over the last four centuries, the 
world  has  been  dominated  by  Western  ideas,  knowledge,  ideology,  philosophy, 
                                            
5  Mervyn King, speech at the University of Exeter, 19 January 2010.  
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technology, and vision. Many Asian countries were colonized by the West. Even now, 
Asians have been passive followers of the West‘s global economic order.   
So, would the global order that Asians want be different from the current one? If so, 
how? We Asians have long wanted to sit at the high table, but do we have the ideas, 
vision, skills, or knowledge to lead the global economy? The answer to these questions 
is not yet clear—at least to me.   
Asians might have wanted to increase their economic weight and participation in global 
governance, but we may not want more global governance: we want to be recognized as 
an  important  power,  to  have  a  greater  share  and  a  bigger  voice  in  international 
organizations,  but  not  necessarily  either  to  be  more  governed  by  global  rules, 
regulations, and institutions, or to take a leadership role and accept greater responsibility 
for addressing global issues. But increased representation at the G20 by Asian nations 
not only gives a greater privilege, but also presents a great responsibility.   
How should Asia respond?   
5.1  Take the Leadership of the Open Multilateral System 
Asian  countries  should  lead  the  efforts  to  maintain  and  contribute  to  further 
strengthening the open multilateral system. This system has been a lynchpin of Asian 
success since World War II. Most Asian economies are very open, depending heavily on 
international trade and investment. Maintaining an open system will be a key to their 
future success. The West‘s  leadership  of the  multilateral  system  has  been  dwindling 
recently, and Asia should now assume this mantle. Asia will suffer more than any other 
region if the world allows the system to fail. 
5.2  Take Greater Responsibility for Global Economic Issues 
Asian  countries  should  take  greater  responsibility  for  global  economic  issues, 
concomitant with their economic status. Increased economic power and status should 
come with increased responsibility. Asian countries are still preoccupied with their own 
domestic issues. (The PRC, for example, is reluctant to assume a leading role as its 
priority is still heavily skewed toward domestic political stability and economic growth.) 
Asian  countries  should  play  a  more  active  role  in  economic  policy  coordination  and 
collaboration even though this may temporarily slow down their export growth. Asian 
economies have already grown too big to continue relying on exports for growth. Their 
growth  strategy  should  rely  more  on  expanding  domestic  demand  through 
macroeconomic  policy  adjustments  (including  exchange  rate  policies)  and  structural 
reforms.   
5.3  Contribute to the Developing World 
Asian  countries  should  more  actively  contribute  to  the  developing  world‘s  economic 
performance. They have emerged as industrial powers from poor, developing countries 
and this experience is still embedded in the current generation. They should share this 
experience  not  only  within  the  region  but  also  across  the  world.  Wealthier  Asian  
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countries  should  increase  their  aid  and  grants  to  developing  countries.  But  more 
important, they should share the knowledge, experience, and know-how of managing 
institutions  and  development  with  developing  countries,  not by  lecturing  them  but  by 
trying to find more effective development paths with them, fitting to their own economic 
and  social  circumstances.  Asian  countries  have  not  been  entirely  happy  with  the 
Washington Consensus, but they have not come up with an alternative development 
model. Asian economists and scholars need to commit to a range of goals, including 
doing more research to synthesize and crystallize the essence of their own development 
experiences; exchanging views more actively among themselves to find best practices 
and  modules  that  can  be  applied  to  other  developing  countries;  collaborating  more 
effectively with their policy makers; and articulating their views in multilateral institutions. 
The Asian Development Bank may be able to play a central role in this endeavor.   
5.4  Increase Voice in International Financial Institutions 
Asia should demand a greater voting share and voice in the IFIs. As the roles of these 
institutions are expected to be strengthened in global economic governance, they should 
be rebalanced toward greater Asian weights. Otherwise, the strengthened roles of these 
institutions could be in Asia‘s disfavor. Asia should not only demand greater share, but 
more seats on their boards, and senior positions.   
Most Asian country currencies are not international currency. As a consequence, they 
are  exposed  to  high  risks  of  foreign  exchange  instability  and  currency  crisis  in  the 
current global financial market environment. They also pay high costs in self-insurance. 
Asian countries should therefore take the lead in strengthening the global financial safety 
net, reforming the IMS. They should push for reform of IMF lending facilities and the link 
between the IMF lending program and regional financing arrangements. The case for an 
increased role for Asia would be even stronger for the World Bank, where more diverse 
ideas and development experience should be reflected in its policy recommendations 
and technical assistance programs to developing countries.   
5.5  Create New Institutions and Forums 
Finally, Asian leaders should try to get themselves better prepared to provide their own 
vision and leadership for the future. The premier economic governance forum has shifted 
from the G7 to the G20. In the G7, only Japan represented Asia. Now it is time for 
change.  At  the  same  time,  however,  Asians  have  to  admit  that  we  lack  the  vision, 
intellectual wealth, and accumulation of knowledge on global issues relative to the West 
and should try hard to start to build  them. For instance,  Asia has only about 10–12 
universities among the top 100 in the world. It has produced only one Nobel Prize winner 
in  economics  out  of  67  so  far.
6  To  this  end,  Asia  needs  to  promote  higher-quality 
education  by  upgrading  academic  institutions  and  think-tanks,  and  to  facilitate  more 
active exchange of views among its intellectuals. The existing Asian institutions should 
provide more occasions for this, and perhaps many new regional forums will have to be 
created  to  facilitate  such  exchanges  and  to  consistently  articulate  Asia‘s  vision  and 
interests in global economic issues.   
                                            
6  Amartya Sen was a Cambridge economist who is an Indian.  
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6.  Concluding Remarks 
 
One of the fundamental causes for the recent global financial crisis was the ―institutional 
mismatch‖—the mismatch between the institutions and the market in the global financial 
system. The development of institutions fell far behind that of financial markets over the 
last two or three decades. The integration and tight interconnections among financial 
markets and the global economy now require a new regulatory framework, which entails 
the reform of the IFIs and the IMS. At the same time, more effective economic policy 
coordination among major players of the global economy is needed, and this cannot be 
achieved without establishing an effective global economic governance system.   
This paper has discussed the necessary reforms of the IMF and the IMS, and how to 
make the G20 an effective governance forum. History shows us that the world suffers 
when incumbent powers fail to give rising powers their proper place. Inclusion of major 
EMEs, including the PRC, Brazil, India, and others in the G20, has been the right move. 
The challenge now is how to make the G20 effective. Without institutional innovations 
within  the  G20,  there  is  a  high  risk  that  its  summits  will  follow  the  path  of  previous 
summit meetings. 
Asia‘s rising powers have now been given seats at the high table of global economic 
governance. Yet they do not seem to be well prepared to provide the new vision and 
leadership required to shape the future global economic system. Increased status and 
representation of Asian countries in the G20 give both privileges and responsibilities to 
Asians. To meet these responsibilities, Asians should put forth greater efforts to develop 
their intellectual leadership in global economic issues, including creating regional forums 
and upgrading academic institutions.    
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Figure 1: Reserve Accumulation, 1995–2009 
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PRC = People‘s Republic of China. 
Note: Advanced economies comprise Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; and Singapore. Data for 
PRC exclude Hong Kong, China and Taipei,China. 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations using data from International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund. 
http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm (accessed December 2010). 
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